Jurisdiction Over Claims Involving Registered Land - Limits on the Land Court's Exclusive Jurisdiction?

The Massachusetts Land Court was created in 1898 to administer the Commonwealth’s land registration system. At its inception, its role was limited to registration proceedings and issues arising from them. Over time, the Legislature reassigned a wide range of real estate disputes to the court, transforming it into a specialized trial court with jurisdiction that now extends well beyond the mechanics of registration. Hawaii is the only other state with a land court, and its jurisdiction remains confined to registration matters.

The court’s expanded authority is the product of successive legislative enactments. In 1904, the Land Court was given exclusive original jurisdiction over writs of entry, petitions to require actions to try title, petitions to determine the validity of encumbrances, and petitions to discharge mortgages, matters previously heard in the Superior Court. (St. 1904, c. 448, § 1). In the following years, its jurisdiction grew to include petitions to determine tidal flat boundaries (St. 1906, c. 50, § 1), proceedings concerning authority to transfer interests in real estate (St. 1906, c. 344, § 1), enforcement of equitable restrictions (St. 1915, c. 112, § 1.), tax title foreclosures (St. 1915, c. 237, § 3), and disputes over municipal and county boundaries (St. 1919, c. 262, § 1).

The 1930s marked a significant broadening of the court’s equity jurisdiction. In 1931, the Land Court received jurisdiction concurrent with the SJC and the Superior Court over suits in equity to quiet title and remove clouds from title. (St. 1931, c. 387, § 1). In 1934, it was granted concurrent jurisdiction over equity matters involving any right, title, or interest in land, except for suits seeking specific performance. (St. 1934, c. 67, § 1). During that same period, the Legislature conferred exclusive jurisdiction over petitions under GL c. 240, § 14A to determine the validity and extent of zoning ordinances and bylaws (St. 1934, c. 263, § 1), and concurrent jurisdiction over equity actions involving redemption of tax titles, disputes among fiduciaries, fraudulent conveyances of real estate, and certain conveyances to governmental entities for designated purposes (St. 1935, c. 318, §§ 1 to 5).

For several decades thereafter, the jurisdictional structure remained largely intact. With enactment of the Zoning Act, GL c. 40A, in 1975, the Land Court’s authority under GL c. 240, § 14A was broadened to include appeals from zoning boards of appeal and special permit granting authorities, concurrent with the Superior Court. (St. 1975, c. 808, § 3). In 1982, jurisdiction over appeals from planning board decisions under the subdivision control law was added. (St. 1982, c. 533, §§ 1 and 2).

The 1986 amendment to GL c. 185, § 1 is central to disputes involving registered land. Through St. 1986, c. 463, § 1, the Legislature granted the Land Court exclusive jurisdiction over “[c]omplaints affecting title to registered land . . . .” (GL c. 185, § 1(a ½)). The amendment addressed uncertainty regarding the authority of other trial courts to adjudicate disputes involving registered parcels. The operative phrase, “affecting title,” has generated substantial appellate interpretation.

In 2002, the Legislature further expanded the court’s jurisdiction. The Land Court received concurrent jurisdiction with the Probate and Family Court over partition actions (St. 2002, c. 393), and concurrent jurisdiction with the SJC and Superior Court over civil actions for trespass to real estate and actions for specific performance of contracts where any right, title, or interest in land is involved. The same legislation extended jurisdiction to certiorari and mandamus actions under GL c. 249, §§ 4 and 5 when land rights are implicated or when disputes arise under the subdivision control law, the zoning act, or municipal land use enactments. Appeals from conservation commission decisions under local wetlands bylaws and appeals under Title 5 of the state sanitary code remain outside the Land Court’s regular jurisdiction.

In 2006, the Legislature established a permit session within the Land Court for larger development projects. (St. 2006, c. 205, § 15; GL c. 185, § 3A). In cases accepted into that session, the court’s concurrent jurisdiction encompasses a broad range of local, regional, and state permitting decisions, including certain matters otherwise excluded from its standard docket.

Additional statutes confer jurisdiction in specific contexts. GL c. 240, § 10A grants concurrent jurisdiction over actions to determine the scope and enforceability of land use restrictions. St. 1943, c. 57 grants concurrent jurisdiction over equity actions related to mortgage foreclosures involving servicemember protections under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act. (50 U.S.C.A. § 3901).

The question that persists is how to determine whether a claim “affects title” to registered land within the meaning of GL c. 185, § 1(a ½). Before 1986, appellate decisions reflected a more flexible approach. In Deacy v. Berberian, 344 Mass. 321 (1962), the SJC upheld the Superior Court’s authority to interpret a Land Court decree concerning a right of way over registered land. (Id. at 328). In Cesarone v. Femino, 340 Mass. 638 (1960), the SJC concluded that a claim alleging forgery of a deed to registered land could proceed in either the Land Court or the Superior Court because it was grounded in general equitable principles. (Id. at 639 to 640).

After the 1986 amendment, the Appeals Court construed the statute more narrowly. In Feinzig v. Ficksman, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 113 (1997), the court vacated a Superior Court judgment enjoining interference with the plaintiffs’ use of registered land, reasoning that the judgment operated as a de facto easement and therefore affected registered title. (Id. at 117). The court distinguished between an order discontinuing a trespass and relief that, in substance, imposes an encumbrance on registered land. (Id. at 115 to 116).

Johnson v. Christ Apostle Church, Mt. Bethel, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 699 (2019), followed that reasoning. There, the Superior Court ordered a church to install gates in a fence so that a neighboring homeowner could continue using a driveway on the church’s registered parcel. (Id. at 700 to 701). The Appeals Court vacated the judgment, holding that it effectively granted a permanent easement and thus intruded on the LandCourt’s exclusive jurisdiction over complaints affecting title to registered land. (Id. at 701; GL c. 185, § 1(a ½)).

O’Donnell v. O’Donnell, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 409 (2009), reflects a different analysis. In that case, the Probate Court adjudicated claims that deeds to registered land were procured by fraud and undue influence. The Appeals Court concluded that the Probate Court could proceed because its judgment would not itself alter the certificate of title. (Id. at 412). The court relied on GL c. 185, § 57, which provides that registration is the operative act that conveys or affects registered land. Under that reasoning, a judgment that determines the validity of deeds does not affect title unless and until a separate act of registration occurs.

These decisions illustrate the tension in applying GL c. 185, § 1(a ½). Under Feinzig and Johnson, relief that functions as an easement or other encumbrance is treated as affecting title and therefore falls within the Land Court’s exclusive jurisdiction. Under O’Donnell, a court may determine the validity of deeds to registered land so long as its judgment does not itself modify the certificate. The case law has not fully reconciled these approaches, and the analysis continues to turn on whether the relief sought would, in substance, burden the registered title.